UCU Counter-Proposals 2026

Read Northumbria UCU's Counter-Proposals to university management's plans for pay and pensions here. These counter-proposals are constructive, cogent, and designed to resolve the dispute and avoid industrial action in good faith.

Total Reward Approach for Academic Staff

UCU Counter-Proposal for Negotiation:

Sharing the Savings, Sharing the Risks

January 2026

"We need to do different things, and to do things differently"

— Leon Mayfield, Chief Financial Officer, 7 January 2026

Summary:

· If staff are to take on some of the risk, they should be offered a bigger % of the reward.

· Freezing TPS staff pay contributes only an estimated ~10% towards the desired savings target of £11m. The hidden non-financial costs and strategic risks of this pathway outweigh any financial benefits.

· Savings can be better achieved by offering a larger incentive (larger saving share) to switch to USS, payable to staff over 5 years (BRIDGE) or a permanent supplement over a longer period (USS-S).

Introduction

UCU Northumbria shares the University's commitment to long-term institutional sustainability. We recognise that the higher education sector faces significant financial pressures and that constructive dialogue between the University and its recognised trade union offers the best prospect of reaching a mutually acceptable outcome.

However, having carefully analysed the Total Reward Approach proposal dated 15 January 2026, UCU has significant concerns regarding both its underlying financial logic and its likely effectiveness in achieving genuine sustainability. The proposal pursues cost reduction through a mechanism that imposes risk exclusively on staff while offering uncertain returns to the institution.

The University has stated its intention to "share some of the cost saving" with staff. UCU welcomes this principle. However, the mechanism proposed, a pay freeze for TPS members, does not share savings; it transfers risk. UCU believes that true sustainability requires a different approach, one founded on the principle of Sharing the Savings, Sharing the Risks. If the University seeks staff cooperation in reducing pension costs, it must be willing to share the benefits of transition rather than simply penalising those who do not comply.

This document sets out our analysis of the proposal's shortcomings and presents two alternative frameworks, BRIDGE and USS-SS, both founded on the principle of Sharing the Savings, Sharing the Risks. Each offers a genuine pathway to sustainable pension cost reduction; the choice between them reflects the University's priorities.

UCU submits this counter-proposal in good faith and a spirit of genuine negotiation, and invites the University to engage with the detailed financial modelling included below which informs our negotiating stance.

Part 1: Analysis of the Total Reward Approach

The £11 Million Figure: Theoretical Maximum, Not Sustainable Planning

The University has stated that the cost difference between TPS (28.68% employer contribution) and USS (14.5%) "equates to over £11m per year" based on 1,200 TPS members. This figure represents the maximum theoretical annual saving that would be realised only if every current TPS member transitioned to USS, a 100% conversion rate.

UCU acknowledges this calculation is arithmetically plausible. However, achieving 100% voluntary transition with the current proposal is neither realistic nor an objective that the University has specifically stated. Moreover, UCU notes that independent pension advisors Mercer, engaged by the University to provide guidance to staff, have indicated that remaining in TPS is the rational choice for most members given the superior benefits of the scheme.

Early evidence from Mercer sessions confirms this. On 23 January 2026, the University reported that approximately 300 colleagues had attended individual Mercer sessions, with 221 responding to Mercer's feedback request. Of these 221 respondents:

61 indicated they intended to move from TPS to USS
46 indicated they intended to stay in TPS
114 said they were undecided

UCU notes that a number of members who attended Mercer sessions have reported they were not asked about their pension intentions at the end of the meeting, raising questions about the completeness of this data. Nevertheless, even accepting these figures at face value, the picture they paint is striking:

Only 300 out of approximately 1200 academic staff currently on TPS (25%) have engaged with the Mercer process at all, and these are likely to be staff most actively considering transition;
Of this self-selected group, only 61 have indicated an intention to switch, just 5% of the 1,200 TPS members;
The remaining 900 TPS members who have not yet engaged with Mercer are, by revealed preference, less motivated to consider transition than those who have.

If the most engaged quartile of staff has produced only 61 likely switchers, there is no basis to assume the less engaged majority will convert at higher, or even equivalent, rates. A realistic projection based on this early evidence suggests an ultimate conversion rate of 10-15%, far below the levels required to achieve the University's stated savings targets.

UCU also notes that the vast majority of post-92 institutions are currently in exactly the same (or worse) position as Northumbria without resorting to proposals of this nature. The differential with pre-92 academic costs is not the simple metric management maintains. Sustainable financial planning cannot be built on theoretical maxima or on the assumption that staff will act against their own financial interests.

The modelling released to UCU via Freedom of Information request reveals the University's analysis to be remarkably simplistic. The model considers only a single pay rise scenario (2%) and does not account for conversion rates, staff attrition, or sensitivity analysis against realistic scenarios. This is not robust financial planning; it is assumption-based arithmetic that has not been stress-tested.

The Pay Freeze Mechanism: Risk Without Reward

The proposal provides that TPS members receive no pay award until the Total Reward Envelope equalises. UCU has analysed the financial impact of this mechanism and believes it reveals a fundamental flaw in the proposal's design, namely that it captures only a fraction of potential savings while transferring all risk to staff.

At an average academic salary of £57,500:

Scenario	Annual Value	% of Potential Saving
TPS member transitions to USS	£8,153.50 saving	100%
TPS member remains, pay frozen (Year 1)	£862.50 saving	10.6%

The pay freeze captures only 10.6% of the potential saving per person in Year 1. For every TPS member who does not transition, 89.4% of the saving opportunity is unrealised.

The pay freeze is therefore not primarily a financial mechanism, it is a behavioural measure designed to pressure staff into transition through the prospect of indefinite real-terms pay reduction. Staff bear all the risk (loss of pension value or loss of pay progression) while the University captures the reward (reduced contributions). This is not shared sacrifice; it is transferred sacrifice.

UCU submits that such an approach breaches our current contractual arrangements, as it prevents some members from reaching the maximum pay for their grade and undermines the principle of equal pay for work rated as equivalent. Sustainable change is best achieved through positive incentives that share the benefits of transition, not punitive consequences that transfer all risk to staff.

The Pay Freeze is Self-Defeating: Elevated Turnover Undermines Sustainability

The proposal's financial model assumes that TPS stayers will passively accept years of frozen pay while remaining employed at the University. UCU submits that this assumption is unrealistic and, more fundamentally, incompatible with institutional sustainability.

Staff facing indefinite pay freezes will seek employment elsewhere, driving elevated turnover among precisely the group from whom the University seeks to extract pay freeze savings. High turnover is itself a threat to sustainability, because it increases recruitment costs, disrupts teaching continuity, damages research culture, and erodes institutional knowledge.

Moreover, turnover driven by pay freezes is not random. The most marketable staff, those with strong publication records, grant income, and external networks, are best positioned to secure alternative employment. The University risks losing precisely the colleagues who contribute most to research performance, student outcomes, and institutional reputation.

Our modelling demonstrates the impact of elevated attrition on pay freeze savings:

TPS Stayer Attrition Rate	Pay Freeze Savings (7 years)	Loss vs Baseline
10.6% (baseline Northumbria turnover)	£13.6m	—
15% (+4.4%)	£11.3m	-£2.3m
20% (+9.4%)	£9.2m	-£4.4m

Source: HESA Table 22 (Academic staff starters and leavers by HE provider), Northumbria five-year average

If the pay freeze drives even modest additional turnover, from 10.6% to 15%, management's pay freeze savings drop by £2.3m. At 20% turnover (entirely plausible for a multi-year freeze), the "savings" from the pay freeze are reduced by one-third.

The pay freeze is therefore self-defeating: the very mechanism designed to extract value from non-transitioning staff drives those staff to leave, taking the supposed savings with them, and imposing additional costs on the institution. This raises questions about whether the unstated aim is workforce reduction through attrition rather than genuine cost sustainability.

The Proposal is Built on Unstable Foundations

The proposal is predicated on the current differential between TPS employer contributions (28.68%) and USS contributions (14.5%). However, these rates are not fixed; they are subject to revaluation approximately every three years.

Until 2024, the differential was much narrower (TPS approximately 24%, USS approximately 21%), and the "saving" from staff being in USS rather than TPS was minimal. There is no guarantee, and considerable reason to doubt, that the current USS rate of 14.5% will be static and sustainable over the long term.

If USS employer contributions rise at the next revaluation, what happens under the Total Reward Approach?

Does everyone's Total Reward Envelope increase, unfreezing pay for TPS members?
Do USS members see a reduction in their salary to maintain the envelope?
What if TPS contributions fall, do TPS members receive a salary increase?

The University has not addressed these questions. Yet staff are being asked to make irreversible pension decisions based on a framework whose key variable, the contribution differential, is liable to change significantly within three years. This is not sustainable planning; it is short-termism.

Auto-Enrolment Creates Ongoing Friction

A further structural complication arises from auto-enrolment regulations. Employers are required to re-enrol opted-out employees into their qualifying pension scheme every three years. Staff who transition from TPS to USS will therefore be automatically re-enrolled in TPS at each three-year cycle and must actively opt out again to remain in USS.

This has several implications the University appears not to have considered:

Each re-enrolment cycle creates administrative burden for HR;
Each cycle presents staff with a fresh decision point at which Mercer's advice, that TPS is the rational choice, applies anew;
Some proportion of converters will inevitably drift back to TPS over time, eroding projected savings.

The proposal treats conversions as permanent, one-time events. The regulatory reality is more complex.

The Hidden Costs of the Total Reward Approach

Beyond its direct financial limitations, the proposal imposes significant costs and risks that are not reflected in management's savings projections and which feed into elevating some of the University’s Strategic Risks (SRs), outlined in recent financial reports:

Hidden Cost	Impact
Industrial action	UCU members have demonstrated willingness to strike. Action covering even a fraction of the pay freeze period would impose direct costs (disruption, student complaints, reputational damage) that eliminate any theoretical advantage. (SR1, SR6). Prolonged pay freezes expose the University to annual rounds of industrial action (SR6, SR7)
Elevated turnover	Pay freezes drive staff to leave. Each departure costs the University in recruitment, onboarding, and lost institutional knowledge, typically estimated at 50-200% of annual salary. (SR2)
Selective turnover	The most marketable staff, those with strong publications, grants, and networks, leave first. The University loses precisely the colleagues who contribute most to REF performance and reputation. (SR2; SR3; SR4)
Delayed retirement	Staff approaching retirement who cannot afford to leave will stay longer, increasing costs (senior staff are more expensive), reducing workforce renewal, and complicating voluntary severance negotiations.
Legal exposure	The proposal creates differential pay for work of equal value, exposing the University to potential equal pay claims and breach of the Framework Agreement. (SR9)
REF portfolio risk	REF portability rules create a game-theoretic problem the University appears not to have considered. Staff who anticipate leaving due to declining real salaries cannot transfer publications to a future employer; rationally, they face an incentive to delay submission decisions until their employment situation is resolved. This is not a matter of intent or strategy on the part of individual researchers, but a structural consequence of REF rules interacting with workforce instability. The University's REF 2029 portfolio may be adversely affected by submission uncertainty among mid-career researchers. (SR3)
Recruitment difficulties	Advertising academic posts with frozen pay progression will deter quality candidates, damaging the University's competitive position. (SR2, SR14)
Staff morale	The discretionary effort that distinguishes good institutions, mentoring, pastoral care, curriculum development, research culture, cannot be mandated. Staff subjected to indefinite pay freezes will withdraw this effort. (SR1)

Summary of Concerns

UCU's concerns with the Total Reward Approach may be summarised as follows:

The headline £11m figure requires 100% transition, an outcome the proposal is not designed to achieve and cannot form the basis of sustainable planning;
The pay freeze mechanism captures only 10.6% of potential savings per non-transitioning member;
The pay freeze is self-defeating: elevated turnover erodes the very savings it seeks to generate while threatening institutional sustainability;
The pay freeze duration is indefinite, dependent on future sector pay settlements;
The proposal is built on current contribution rates that are liable to change significantly within three years;
Auto-enrolment regulations create ongoing administrative burden and conversion attrition;
The proposal places all risk on staff and all reward with the institution, violating the principle of Sharing the Savings, Sharing the Risks;
The proposal's reliance on negative consequence rather than positive incentive suppresses transition rates and damages the trust necessary for genuine institutional sustainability.

Part 2: Two Frameworks Founded on Shared Principles

UCU presents two alternative frameworks, both founded on the principle of Sharing the Savings, Sharing the Risks. Each offers a genuine pathway to sustainable pension cost reduction; the choice between them reflects the University's priorities.

	BRIDGE	USS-SS
Full name	Balanced Retention and Institutional Development through Genuine Engagement	USS Salary Supplement
Core mechanism	One-off Transition Support Scheme payment (40-50% of salary) phased over 5 years	Ongoing monthly non-pensionable salary supplement (£300/month) for all USS members
Primary strength	Financial optimisation: delivers stronger net savings through targeted incentives	Structural integrity: preserves single salary scale in perpetuity
Who receives payment	Staff who transition from TPS to USS	All USS members (existing, converters, and new starters)
Duration	Fixed 5-year commitment per converter	Permanent ongoing framework
Pay freeze	None	None
National pay awards	All staff receive in full	All staff receive in full

If the University prioritises maximum financial savings, BRIDGE offers the stronger outcome through targeted one-off incentives that capture the full value of each transition.

If the University prioritises structural simplicity and long-term framework consistency, USS-SS offers a permanent mechanism that applies equally to all USS members, present and future, while preserving a single salary scale in perpetuity.

UCU is prepared to negotiate on either basis. The following sections set out each framework in detail.

Part 3: The BRIDGE Framework

Balanced Retention and Institutional Development through Genuine Engagement

BRIDGE addresses the University's financial objectives through targeted one-off incentives that maximise the value captured from each transition. By offering a meaningful Transition Support Scheme payment, BRIDGE achieves conversion rates that the punitive pay freeze cannot match, while retaining the majority of savings for the institution.

Core Principles

Enhanced Transition Incentive: A Transition Support Scheme (TSS) payment of 40-50% of annual salary, recognising the genuine long-term value differential between TPS and USS benefits.
No Pay Freeze: All academic staff receive sector pay awards regardless of pension scheme membership.
Phased Payment Structure: TSS payments spread over five years to manage institutional cash flow without requiring clawback mechanisms.
Known Costs, Predictable Outcomes: The TSS cost is fixed at the point of agreement; the transition savings are calculable from day one.

Five-Year Phased Payment Structure

To address concerns regarding institutional cash flow and to create natural retention incentives, BRIDGE structures Transition Support Scheme payments over five years with built-in adjustment for staff who leave before the payment period completes:

Year	% of Total TSS	Approx. Payment (40% TSS)
1	20%	£4,600
2	20% (adj. for attrition)	£4,100
3	20% (adj. for attrition)	£3,700
4	20% (adj. for attrition)	£3,300
5	20% (adj. for attrition)	£3,000

Staff who leave before completing five years forfeit remaining payments, providing natural attrition adjustment without requiring clawback mechanisms.

Financial Projections

Under realistic assumptions (60-80% conversion with meaningful incentive vs 10-15% under the pay freeze approach), BRIDGE delivers superior outcomes in 94-100% of scenarios modelled. The sensitivity analysis in Appendix B demonstrates this robustness.

The core insight is this: every £1 spent on incentives that secure genuine transition captures the full £8,153.50 annual saving; the pay freeze captures only £862.50 in Year 1 while leaving £7,291 on the table, and drives the very staff from whom it seeks to extract value to leave.

Part 4: The USS-SS Framework

USS Salary Supplement

We propose that the Total Reward Approach is abandoned and replaced with a USS Salary Supplement (USS-SS) which would be payable to all staff who choose to opt for a USS pension. This payment would be made monthly in addition to the salary due, according to the single salary scale for the appropriate grade. The payment would be unconsolidated, and without pension contributions.

The exact amount would require consideration, but a greater amount offered would be more likely to attract more staff to switch pension schemes; ultimately that is a decision for management to make. For example, if the annual saving on a mean salary with a USS contribution rather than a TPS one is £8,000, then a USS-SS of £220 per month, splitting savings on a roughly 1:2 basis, is likely to attract more staff to switch pension scheme than a monthly supplement of £110. The University would still be benefitting by substantial savings (around £7.5m according to management's figures), which it would not otherwise achieve if the current status quo were to prevail.

Additionally, a more attractive offer is likely to result in more staff switching immediately, making the savings effectual from August 2026, rather than the gradually accumulated savings from freezing pay for those in TPS (until 'equalisation' under a TRA is reached, at least 7 years by management's estimation, and considerably longer in ours). Furthermore, the USS-SS scheme could operate flexibly such that management would be able to alter the amount offered as circumstances change. For example, if costs in USS were to rise and therefore the benefit from having staff in that scheme rather than TPS were to reduce, then the amount offered in a USS-SS could be decreased in tandem.

Core Principles

Single Salary Scale Preserved: All academic staff remain on the same salary scale regardless of pension scheme. There is no two-tier workforce and no breach of the Framework Agreement.
Sharing the Savings: The University shares a portion of pension savings with USS members through a monthly supplement, splitting savings on a roughly 1:2 basis, while retaining the majority.
No Pay Freeze: All academic staff receive national pay awards in full.
Collective Bargaining Integrity: The supplement sits outside the national pay framework, preserving sector-wide collective bargaining.
Flexibility: The supplement level can be adjusted as circumstances change, for example if USS contribution rates rise.
Future-Proofed: By establishing that pension cost reductions must be shared with staff, USS-SS protects against future attempts to shift staff to even cheaper schemes without negotiated compensation.

The USS-SS Mechanism

Eligibility: All academic staff enrolled in USS receive the supplement
Payment: A fixed monthly amount (proposed: £300/month), paid alongside salary, unconsolidated and without pension contributions
Existing USS Members: The 220 current USS members receive the supplement, recognising that they accepted a less valuable pension

Supplement Level: A Basis for Negotiation

The supplement level is intrinsically linked to the conversion rate the University wishes to achieve:

Monthly Supplement	Net Saving per Converter	University Retains	Expected Conversion
£200	£5,753	71%	50-55%
£250	£5,153	63%	55-65%
£300	£4,553	56%	65-75%
£350	£3,953	48%	75-85%

The supplement is a lever, not a fixed demand. UCU invites the University to consider what conversion rate it wishes to target and negotiate accordingly.

Financial Projections

At £300/month supplement with 70% conversion, USS-SS delivers approximately £38m in savings over 10 years compared to the status quo, with savings growing annually as the USS pool expands.

Part 5: Comparative Summary

The following table summarises the key differences between the Total Reward Approach and UCU's two proposed frameworks:

Dimension	Total Reward Approach	BRIDGE	USS-SS
Mechanism	Pay freeze for TPS members	One-off TSS payment to converters	Ongoing supplement to all USS
Conversion rate assumed	20-30%	60-80%	70%
Pay freeze	Yes (indefinite)	No	No
Single salary scale	No (two scales)	Yes	Yes
Risk allocation	All on staff	Shared	Shared
Industrial action risk	High	Low	Low
Legal exposure	Significant	Minimal	Minimal
Framework consistency	Complex legacy	Fixed commitment	Permanent structure

The Choice Before the University

UCU offers the University a genuine choice between two frameworks, each with distinct advantages:

Choose BRIDGE if the University prioritises:

Maximum net financial savings through targeted incentives;
Fixed, time-limited commitment (5-year payment structure);
Budget certainty with known upfront costs.

Choose USS-SS if the University prioritises:

Structural simplicity with a single salary scale preserved in perpetuity.
A permanent, consistent framework for all USS members.
Protection against future pension degradation through established principle.

Both frameworks share the same foundational principle: Sharing the Savings, Sharing the Risks. Both eliminate the pay freeze, preserve collective bargaining, and deliver genuine savings through positive incentives rather than punitive consequences.

Part 6: Conclusion and Invitation to Negotiate

The University's Chief Financial Officer has called for Northumbria to "do different things, and to do things differently." UCU agrees. The Total Reward Approach represents neither; it is a conventional cost-shifting exercise that transfers risk to staff while offering uncertain returns to the institution.

BRIDGE and USS-SS each offer a genuinely different approach: frameworks founded on the principle that sustainable change requires Sharing the Savings, Sharing the Risks.

UCU's Core Principles (Non-Negotiable)

No pay freeze or pay detriment for staff exercising their right to remain in TPS;
Northumbria remains within national collective bargaining;
Any transition incentive must be genuinely voluntary, not coerced.

UCU is willing to negotiate the mechanism and level of transition incentives. We are not willing to negotiate on punitive measures against staff who choose to remain in their current pension scheme.

Invitation to Negotiate

UCU presents these counter-proposals in a spirit of genuine engagement. We recognise that the University faces real financial pressures and that pension costs are a legitimate concern. We are not seeking to preserve the status quo indefinitely; we are seeking a fair and sustainable pathway to cost reduction that respects staff as partners rather than treating them as obstacles.

We invite the University to:

Engage with our analysis of the Total Reward Approach's limitations;
Consider which framework, BRIDGE or USS-SS, best aligns with the University's priorities;
Share its assumptions regarding target conversion rates, so that we may jointly calibrate the optimal incentive structure;
Enter good-faith negotiations with a view to reaching agreement that serves both institutional sustainability and staff welfare.

The principle of Sharing the Savings, Sharing the Risks offers a foundation for agreement. UCU is ready to negotiate.

Appendix A: Modelling Assumptions

All financial projections in this document are based on the following assumptions:

Parameter	Value	Source/Notes
Current TPS members	1,200	University proposal
Current USS members	220	University proposal
Average academic salary	£57,500	Estimated from proposal data
TPS employer contribution	28.68%	Current rate
USS employer contribution	14.5%	Current rate
Contribution differential	14.18%	TPS minus USS
Annual saving per transition	£8,153.50	Salary × differential
Normal attrition rate	10.6%	HESA Table 22, Northumbria 5-year average
Elevated attrition (pay freeze)	20%	UCU estimate
Time horizon	10 years	Standard planning horizon

Appendix B: BRIDGE Sensitivity Analysis

The following analysis demonstrates BRIDGE's performance across a range of scenarios. Values show BRIDGE savings minus Total Reward Approach savings (£m); positive values indicate BRIDGE advantage.

Section 1: Equal Attrition Scenarios

For completeness, this section shows scenarios where both TRA and BRIDGE operate at normal attrition (10.6%). These scenarios understate BRIDGE's advantage because they do not account for the elevated turnover the pay freeze would cause.

1.5% pay rise (7 years to equalisation) — BRIDGE wins: 12/16 (75%)

BRIDGE TSS	TRA 15%	TRA 20%	TRA 25%	TRA 30%
35% (→60%)	+1.2	-0.4	-2.1	-3.7
40% (→70%)	+3.6	+1.9	+0.2	-1.4
45% (→80%)	+5.3	+3.7	+2.0	+0.4
50% (→90%)	+6.5	+4.8	+3.2	+1.5

2.0% pay rise (6 years to equalisation) — BRIDGE wins: 9/16 (56%)

BRIDGE TSS	TRA 15%	TRA 20%	TRA 25%	TRA 30%
35% (→60%)	0.0	-1.6	-3.2	-4.7
40% (→70%)	+2.3	+0.7	-0.9	-2.4
45% (→80%)	+4.1	+2.5	+0.9	-0.7
50% (→90%)	+5.3	+3.7	+2.1	+0.5

3.0% pay rise (4 years to equalisation) — BRIDGE wins: 14/16 (88%)

BRIDGE TSS	TRA 15%	TRA 20%	TRA 25%	TRA 30%
35% (→60%)	+3.2	+1.4	-0.4	-2.1
40% (→70%)	+5.5	+3.7	+2.0	+0.2
45% (→80%)	+7.2	+5.5	+3.7	+1.9
50% (→90%)	+8.4	+6.7	+4.9	+3.1

Summary by Pay Rise Assumption (Equal Attrition)

Pay Rise	Years Freeze	BRIDGE Wins	Win Rate
1.0%	11	6/16	38%
1.5%	7	12/16	75%
2.0%	6	9/16	56%
2.5%	5	10/16	62%
3.0%	4	14/16	88%

Section 2: Impact of Elevated Attrition on TRA

The following analysis demonstrates how elevated attrition among TPS stayers (driven by the pay freeze) affects TRA outcomes and BRIDGE's relative advantage. At 1.5% pay rise:

TRA Stayer Attrition	TRA Pay Freeze Value	BRIDGE Wins
10.6% (normal)	£13.6m	12/16 (75%)
12.0%	£12.8m	13/16 (81%)
15.0%	£11.3m	15/16 (94%)
18.0%	£10.0m	15/16 (94%)
20.0%	£9.2m	16/16 (100%)

Conclusion: If the pay freeze drives even modest additional turnover (+5%), BRIDGE wins in 94% of scenarios. If turnover reaches 20%, a conservative estimate for multi-year pay freezes, BRIDGE wins in 100% of scenarios.

— End of Document —